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Health Reform: What’s Insurance Got
to Do With It?
Recognizing Health Insurance as a
Separate Species of Insurance
Wendy K. Mariner†

I. INTRODUCTION
Health reform debates in the United States are typically conducted using
the language of insurance.1 President Barack Obama described his hopes for
expanding access to care as “health insurance reform.”2 Both proponents and
opponents of reform debated the merits of reform proposals leading to the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 in insurance terms.3 Yet,
disagreements over the structure of reform reveal deep differences in what
proponents and opponents of reform mean by insurance and the role it should
†

JD, LLM, MPH, Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law, Boston University School of
Public Health, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, Professor of Socio-Medical
Sciences and Community Medicine, Boston University School of Medicine. My thanks to
George Annas, Deborah Stone and Jeffrey Stempel for helpful comments on an earlier version
of this paper, and to Katherine Proctor, JD 2009, BUSL, for research assistance. Errors and
omissions remain my own.
1
See, e.g., TOM DASCHLE ET AL., CRITICAL: WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THE HEALTH-CARE
CRISIS 4 (2008); Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health
Reform, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 199 (2008).
2
See, e.g., Transcript, Obama’s Fifth News Conference, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009, available
at www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/us/politics/22obama.transcript.html; Remarks by the
President in the State of the Union Address, Jan. 27, 2010, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address.
3
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, Mar. 23, 2010, as
amended by the Health Care and Education Affordability Act, Pub. L. 111-152, Mar. 30, 2010
[hereinafter “the 2010 Act”]. See, e.g., REGINA HERZLINGER, WHO KILLED HEALTH CARE? 15
(2007) (criticizing insurance benefits); LAURENCE KOTLIKOFF, THE HEALTHCARE FIX –
UNIVERSAL INSURANCE FOR ALL AMERICANS 15 (2007) (arguing for a single health insurance
system for the entire country).
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play in mediating access to health care. Scholars of insurance law are likely to
describe insurance somewhat narrowly as a risk spreading device.4 Industry
representatives, among others, often view conventional indemnity insurance
as the norm.5 From this perspective, reforms that move too far beyond
underwriting risks can be seen as undermining actuarial fairness, threatening
the very idea of insurance and possibly the industry itself. 6 In contrast, most
reform proponents discuss insurance as though it were simply a mechanism
for financing health care: Health insurance ought to be universally available
(on affordable terms, if not free), because health care ought to be universally
available,7 perhaps a human right.8 From this perspective, most underwriting
techniques are incompatible with the goals of reform.9
4
See, e.g., Kenneth Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and
Public Policy (1986) (finding one of the primary values of insurance law is the proper
distribution of risk); Malcolm Clarke, Policies and Perceptions of Insurance: An
Introduction to Insurance Law 5-6 (1997) (describing health insurance as a risk spreading
device). Insurance law casebooks typically describe insurance in these terms and, until
recently, included only brief sections on health insurance. See, e.g., Emeric Fischer et al.,
Principles of Insurance Law (3d ed. 2006) (devoting 19 pages—of 1080 pages—to
discussion of health insurance); Kenneth Abraham, Insurance Law and Regulation:
Cases and Materials (4th ed. 2005) (devoting 53 pages—of 774 pages—to discussion of
health insurance).
5
See Inside the Minds: The Insurance Business: Industry Leaders on Managing
Risks, Ensuring Investments, & Protecting Assets 8 (Marissa Berenson ed., 2004); Press
Release, America’s Health Ins. Plans, AHIP Statement on House Passage of HR 3962 (Nov. 7,
2009), available at http://www.ahip.org/content/pressrelease.aspx?docid=28730; Staff of
H.R. Committee on Ways & Means Republicans, The Commonsense Healthcare
Reform and Affordability Act: Making Health Insurance More Affordable for
Families, Affordable for Small Businesses & Affordable for America 2 (Comm. Print
2009) (prohibiting “arbitrary caps” and “unjust” rescission).
6
Bruce G. Bodaken, Where Does the Insurance Industry Stand on Health Reform Today?,
27 Health Aff. 667, 670-71 (2008) (noting that guaranteed issue and not basing rates on
health status threaten “basic and long-standing principles of the health insurance business,”
although some insurers favored reforms like individual mandates that expand the market). See
also Interview by Bill Moyers with Wendell Potter, Bill Moyers Journal: Profits or Patients
(PBS
television
broadcast
July
10,
2009),
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/07102009/watch2.html. For an historical perspective,
see The Politics of Health Care Reform: Lessons from the Past, Prospects for the
Future (James A. Morone & Gary S. Belkin eds., 1994) (providing a compilation of articles
discussing insurance reform).
7
See, e.g., Daschle, supra note 1, at xiii (arguing for a universal health care system);
Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance, Institute of Medicine, Insuring
America’s Health: Principles and Recommendations 110-11 (2004) (describing a vision
to expand coverage to those without health insurance); The Physicians’ Working Group for
Single-Payer National Health Insurance, Special Communication, Proposal of the Physicians’
Working Group for Single-Payer National Health Insurance, 290 JAMA 798, 798-805 (2003).
8
See, e.g., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); Sofia Gruskin & Daniel Tarantola,
Health and Human Rights, in Perspectives in Health and Human Rights 3, 11 (Sofia
Gruskin, Michael Grodin, George Annas & Stephen P. Marks eds. 2005); Norman Daniels,
Brendan Saloner & Adriane H. Gelpi, Access, Cost, and Financing: Achieving an Ethical
Health Reform, 28 Health Aff. w909, w909-16 (2009); Sofia Gruskin et al., Health and
Human Rights 1, History, Principles and Practice of Health and Human Rights, 370 Lancet
449, 449-55 (2007); Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Right to Health: What Does This
Mean for Our National and World?, 34 Ind. L. Rev. 1457, 1457-58 (2001).
9
See, e.g., Deceptive Health Industry Practices: Are Consumers Getting What They Paid
For?- Part I: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong. (Mar. 26,
2009); Deceptive Health Industry Practices: Are Consumers Getting What They Paid For?-
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I have argued elsewhere that such conflicting conceptions of health
insurance can impede agreement on a unified structure of reform.10 Here, I
argue that it is possible to reconcile these conceptions if we recognize health
insurance as a separate species of insurance – distinct in function, and
therefore content, from conventional indemnity insurance models. Both
regulation and industry practices already have moved health insurance a long
way toward becoming an identifiably separate species by limiting some risk
classification methods, but universal coverage requires purging or greatly
circumscribing most tools of conventional insurance. In addition, health
plans no longer limit coverage to fortuitous losses, as does conventional
indemnity insurance; by covering preventive care, they have added a service
component to pay for regular care. This is a familiar concept in social
insurance systems, which are more concerned with financing care than
spreading risk. The role of insurance in such systems, especially in Western
European countries, offers a model for integrating insurance plans and
actuarial expertise into a financing mechanism for universal access to care.11
Thus, health insurance can be, and to a large extent already is, a separate
species of insurance. Little conventional insurance remains in today’s health
plans,12 and there is little reason to believe that conventional insurance is
necessary to provide access to health care. 13 However, even our hybrid species
of health insurance is not likely to be universally affordable without ensuring
participation by virtually all Americans.14
Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong. (Mar. 31,
2009); see also Coverage Denied: How the Current Health Insurance System Leaves Millions
Behind, http://www.healthreform.gov/reports/denied_coverage/index.html. For a different
perspective on assumptions about reform, see David A. Hyman, Employment-Based Health
Insurance and Universal Coverage: Four Things People Know That Aren’t So, 9 Yale J.
Health Pol’y, L. & Ethics 435, 435-52 (2009).
10
Mariner, supra note 1, at 200.
11
This will also require modifying some insurance law doctrines to accommodate the
hybrid nature of health insurance, a topic that deserves more extensive discussion, but is
beyond the scope of this article. See Thomas Morawetz, Insurance: How It Matters as
Psychological Fact and Political Metaphor, 6 Conn. Ins. L.J. 1, 8 (1999) (“The line between
insurance as a commodity, as an option, and insurance as a compulsory part of government
regulation is always a moving target.”).
12
Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research & Educational Trust, Employer Health
Benefits 2008 Annual Survey, 1, available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/7790.pdf [hereinafter
“Employer Health Benefits 2008 Annual Survey”].
13
Congress could achieve universal coverage without the use of private sector insurance
by expanding Medicare coverage to all or creating new, supplementary programs funded from
tax revenues, as some scholars, policy analysts, and organizations have recommended. See,
e.g., Julius B. Richmond & Rashi Fein, The Health Care Mess: How We Got Into It
and What It Will Take to Get Out 243 (2005); John Nichols, Three Words Mr. President:
“Medicare
for
All,”
The
Nation,
Sept.
8,
2009,
http://www.thenation.com/blogs/thebeat/469901/three_words_mr_president_medicare_for
_all ( Sept. 8, 2009, 10:07 EST). Political, as well as scholarly, opposition has precluded such
an approach. Jacob S. Hacker, Putting Politics First: Health System Reform Can Be Successful
This Time If Policymakers Learn the Lessons From the Past , 27 Health Aff. 718, 721 (2008).
See, e.g., David Hyman, Medicare Meets Mephistopheles (2006); Alan B. Miller, Opinion,
Medicare for All Isn’t the Answer, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2009, at A15; Peter Ferrara, Medicare
for
All
Is
a
Killer,
American
Spectator,
May
27,
2009,
http://spectator.org/archives/2009/05/27/medicare-for-all-is-a-killer.
14
See the 2010 Act, §1501 (adding §5000A to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), as
amended by the 2010 Act, § 10106, and by the Reconciliation Act, §1002. At least fourteen
states have filed challenges to the 2010 Act, claiming that it violates Congress’s power under
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II. CONVENTIONAL INSURANCE RISK CLASSIFICATIONS ARE
INCOMPATIBLE WITH EXPANDED ACCESS
A key goal of health reform is to give everyone access to health care.
Health insurance is simply a means to that larger end: appropriate, affordable
health care regardless of employment, residence, health status, age or other
factors that currently inhibit access. To use insurance to pay for care,
insurance must be available to everyone. Thus, as reform proposals
recommended, the 2010 Act requires plans to pay for health care in ways that
necessarily limit the scope of conventional insurance techniques. President
Obama and members of Congress stressed that reform legislation should
prohibit insurers from classifying people according to their risks in order to
refuse coverage or greatly increase insurance premiums.15 The 2010 Act,16 as
well as the Affordable Health Care for America Act,17 which the House of
Representatives passed on November 7, 2009, and virtually all the reform
bills seriously considered by Congressional Committees, prohibit insurers18
from refusing to cover preexisting medical conditions,19 refusing people

the Commerce Clause, the power to tax and spend, the Tenth Amendment or federalism
generally. See Warren Richey, Attorneys General in 14 States Sue to Block Healthcare Reform
Law,
The
Christian
Sci.
Mon.,
Mar.
23,
2010,
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0323/Attorneys-general-in-14-states-sue-toblock-healthcare-reform-law. The constitutional authority for a federal requirement that all
individuals have coverage is beyond the scope of this article. For the basic arguments for and
against the propositions that that an individual mandate is within Congress’s Commerce
Power and that fees levied on individuals without coverage are not direct taxes, see David B.
Rivkin, Jr. et al., Debate, A Healthy Debate: The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate,
158
U.
PA.
L.
Rev.
PENNumbra
93
(2009),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/HealthyDebate.pdf. If challenges to the individual
mandate succeed, Congress could achieve the same result without raising constitutional
questions by increasing the income tax, Medicare tax, or Social Security tax, or imposing a new
tax on all taxpayers, accompanied by a tax credit or deduction for those who have public or
private coverage. See the 2010 Act, § 1401 (adding § 36B to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986), as amended by the 2010 Act, § 10105, and by the Reconciliation Act, §1001.
15
Remarks by the President in Discussion on Insurance Reform at Bipartisan Meeting on
Health Care Reform, Feb. 25, 2010, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-discussion-insurance-reform-bipartisan-meeting-health-carereform; Michael D. Shear & Debbi Wilgoren, As House and Senate Negotiate, Obama FineTunes
His
Pitch,
Wash.
Post,
July
29,
2009,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/07/29/obama_to_offer_eightpoint_arg.html?hpid=topnews; see also Affordable Health Choices Act, S. 1679, 111th Cong. §
2701 (1st Sess. 2009); America's Healthy Future Act of 2009, S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 2204 (1st
Sess. 2009); America’s Affordable Health Choices Act, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 113 (1st Sess.
2009).
16
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, supra note 3, originally H.R. 3590, 111th
Cong. (as passed by Senate Dec. 24, 2009).
17
Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (as passed by House
Nov. 7, 2009).
18
The prohibitions and requirements of the 2010 Act apply to private insurance plans in
the individual and group market, including qualified plans offered in new health insurance
exchanges, the 2010 Act, Title I, Subtitle D, and not to grandfathered employer-sponsored
plans subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§1001 et seq,
although certain provisions will apply to new employer-sponsored plans.
19
The 2010 Act, § 1201 (2010) (adding Public Health Service Act, § 2704, 42 U.S.C.
§§300gg et seq.); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 211 (2009); S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009) (to
amend Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2705); S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 1001 (2009)
(same); H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 111 (2009).

440 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 36 NO. 2&3 2010
coverage because of their medical history,20 dropping coverage after illness
occurs,21 discriminating on the basis of health status,22 discriminating in
benefits on the basis of age or disability,23 charging much higher premiums on
the basis of age,24 providing less coverage for mental health and substance
abuse disorder benefits than for medical conditions,25 capping the dollar
amount of coverage,26 and charging high out-of-pocket expenses.27 The public
also appears to support regulating health insurance coverage in this manner.28
These prohibitions remove tools of risk classification that insurers have
regarded as essential to permit underwriting in conventional insurance, if not
inherent in the concept of insurance itself.29 Conventional indemnity
insurance in an unregulated, competitive market relies on risk classification
(by definition, a discriminatory process) to exclude bad risks and to
underwrite or price those accepted according to their risk profiles.30 Familiar
examples include homeowners insurance and life insurance. To achieve
universal (or nearly so) access to health care, therefore, reform legislation
must prune and pad health plans so that they no longer look or function like
conventional indemnity insurance policies.
Medical underwriting and
preexisting condition exclusions must be suppressed like bad genes, while
guaranteed issue and preventive measures are grafted on.

20
The 2010 Act, § 1201 (2010) (adding Public Health Service Act, §§ 2702, 2703 to
guarantee issue and renewal, respectively); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 212 (2009); S. 1679, 111th
Cong. § 101 (2009); S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 1001 (2009); H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 122 (2009).
21
The 2010 Act, § 1001 (2010) (adding Public Health Service Act, § 2712 to prohibit
rescission); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 103 (2009); S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009); H.R.
3200, 111th Cong. § 112 (2009).
22
The 2010 Act, § 1201 (2010) (adding Public Health Service Act § 2705); H.R. 3962,
111th Cong. § 211 (2009).
23
The 2010 Act, § 1302(b)(4)(B) (2010); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. §§ 213, 214 (2009); S.
1679, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009); S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 1001 (2009); H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. §
113 (2009).
24
The 2010 Act, § 1201 (2010) (adding Public Health Service Act, § 2701(a)(1)(A)(iii) to
limit premium rate variation based on age to 3:1); S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009); S. 1796,
111th Cong. § 1001 (2009); H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 114 (2009); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 214
(2009).
25
2010 Act, § 1311(j) (2010); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 214 (2009); H.R. 3200, 111th
Cong. § 114 (2009).
26
The 2010 Act, § 1001 (2010) (no lifetime or annual limits on dollar value of benefits);
H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. §§ 106, 109 (2009); S. 1697, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009); H.R. 3200,
111th Cong. § 122(a)(3) (2009).
27
The 2010 Act, §§ 1201, 1302(c); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 222(c) (2009); S. 1796, 111th
Cong. § 1201 (2009); H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 122(c) (2009).
28
Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard School of Public Health, The Public’s
Health Care Agenda for the New President and Congress 10 (Jan. 2009),
http://kff.org/kaiserpolls/7853.cfm. A recent poll of public opinions of the 2009 House and
Senate Bills find that 63% of those surveyed favor provisions that prohibit insurers from
denying coverage on the basis of health conditions. Kaiser Family Foundation, Kaiser
Health Tracking Poll: Public Opinion on Health Care Issues 5 (Jan. 2010),
http://kff.org/kaiserpolls/8042.cfm.
29
Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk
Classification, 9 Conn. Ins. L.J. 371, 377 (2003).
30
Emmett J. Vaughan & Therese M. Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk and
Insurance 169-71 (10th ed. 2008); Harry A. Woodman, Principles of Risk Selection and
Classification, in Medical Selection of Life Risks 25, 35 (R.D.C. Brackenridge & W. John
Elder eds., 4th ed. 1998).
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What remains of conventional insurance is risk rating – setting premiums
according to risk profiles, analogous to charging loan interest rates according
to credit-worthiness. Neither the Act nor the reform proposals that preceded
it restrict premiums beyond imposing rate bands for plans to be offered on
exchanges, limiting the degree to which the premium for an insurer’s highest
priced product may exceed the premium for its lowest priced product for a
defined population.31 Thus, it will still be necessary to estimate a population’s
total need for medical services in order to calculate premium rates that can
cover the cost of providing benefits, as well as administrative costs, profit and
taxes.32 However, to make premiums affordable to all, subsidies will be
needed for low-income people with higher health risks.33 Moreover, if health
plans must accept anyone who applies, then plans (public or private) with
high risk populations will need subsidies or access to reinsurance if premiums
are to remain competitive across the market,34 possibly financed by taxes on
individuals or health plans with healthy populations.35 Such redistributional
measures are necessary to achieve affordable premiums, but they distance
premium rates from individual and even group risk. Indeed, the calculations
may differ little from those needed for financing many non-insurance services.
The more that risk rating is diluted with redistributional funding, the more
health plans look like vehicles to finance health care.
III. CONVENTIONAL INDEMNITY HEALTH INSURANCE IS
DISAPPEARING
The health insurance industry in the United States is already far down the
path toward becoming primarily a health care payer, and only secondarily an
insurer of health risks. Federal and state laws have circumscribed insurers’
freedom to use risk classification by mandating coverage of specific benefits
and prohibiting the exclusion of some risks or charging higher premiums for
others.36 For example, federal and many state laws prohibit discriminating
against or excluding anyone from health coverage on the basis of a health
factor, 37 experiencing domestic violence, 38 or genetic testing.39 Some states
31
See, e.g., the 2010 Act, § 1201 (2010) (adding Public Health Service Act, § 2701 to allow
premium rate variations based on individual or family coverage, rating area, age, and tobacco
use); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 213 (2009); H.R. 3590, 11th Cong. § 1201 (2009). Both bills
also limit cost sharing. Supra note 28.
32
National health spending was $2.3 trillion in 2008, or $7,681 per person, and 16.2% of
GDP. See Micah Hartman et al., Health Spending Growth At A Historic Low in 2008, 29
Health Aff. 147, 147 (2010).
33
Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. Econ. Lit. 571,
572, 587 (Sept. 2008). The 2010 Act provides for tax credits and subsidies.
34
Elliot K. Wicks, Restructuring Health Insurance Markets, National
Academy
of
Social
Insurance
1,
13-14
(Jan.
2009),
available
at
http://www.nasi.org/research/2009/restructuring-health-insurance-markets.
35
Victor R. Fuchs, The Proposed Government Health Insurance Company – No Substitute
for Real Reform, 360 New Eng. J. Med. 2273, 2275 (2009); Jacob S. Hacker, Health Care
2009 – The Why and How of “Public-Plan Choice,” 360 New Eng. J. Med. 2269, 2269 (2009);
Mark Hall, The Structure and Enforcement of Health Insurance Rating Reforms, 37 INQUIRY
367, 377-78 (2001).
36
National Conference of State Legislatures, Health Reform: State Examples (Mar. 22,
2010), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=17691.
37
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (West 2008).
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also prohibit or limit risk rating on the basis of gender, at least in group
policies. However, San Francisco’s Attorney General has sued the insurance
commissioner for permitting health insurers to use gender rating in individual
insurance policies.40 If, as reported, women use more medical services than
men,41 then it would be actuarially fair to charge women higher premiums
than men, as many states permit.42 This actuarial fairness argument is
regularly invoked to justify higher premiums for the elderly, smokers and
others with above average health risks.43 If the goal of a reformed health
system is to treat everyone the same, however, then actuarial fairness is
irrelevant.
Insurance companies already function solely as payment intermediaries
rather than conventional insurers for tens of millions of Americans in
employee group health plans. In 2008, 55% of employees with health
insurance participated in employer-sponsored plans that are fully or partially
self-insured (up from 49% in 2000).44 Insurance companies do not issue
insurance policies to such plans. The employer bears the financial risk of loss
(hence the term “self-insured”), and typically hires an insurance company or
other third-party-administrator to administer the plan (collect contributions
and pay claims) for a fee.
Insurance companies also perform administrative services for government
benefit programs, Medicare in particular.45 Medicare is not a conventional
insurance system, despite its title, Health Insurance for the Aged and
Disabled.46 Rather, it is a statutory entitlement program, with benefits,
premiums and provider payments authorized by statute and specified by
regulations. Although Medicare must calculate needed funds based on risk, it
does not engage in underwriting practices, such as excluding high risks.
Rather, it automatically covers retirees over 65 years of age, as well as disabled

38
Id. See Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing Actually Fair?: A
Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 355, 355-56 (1997).
39
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (West 2008).
40
Nathan Olivarez-Giles, California Health Insurers Discriminate Against Women,
Lawsuit Contends, L.A. Times, Jan. 28. 2009, at C1.
41
Cameron A. Mustard et al., Sex Differences in the Use of Health Care Services, 338 New
Eng. J. Med. 1678, 1678 (1998); Paul D. Cleary et al., Sex Differences in Medical Care
Utilization: An Empirical Investigation, 23 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 106, 106 (1982).
42
Jane Slater, Colorado Women Pay More for Insurance Than Men,
TheDenverChannel,
Oct.
19,
2009,
http://www.thedenverchannel.com/health/21343272/detail.html; Barbara Barrett, N.C. Lets
Insurers
Charge
Women
More,
McClatchy,
Oct.
12,
2009,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/story/76996.html.
43
See Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Insurance , 18 J. Health, Pol. Pol’y &
L. 287, 287-88 (1993).
44
Employer Health Benefits 2008 Annual Survey, supra note 12, at 154-55.
45
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (2006).
46
Theodore Marmor, et al., America's Misunderstood Welfare State:
Persistent Myths, Enduring Realities 178-79 (1990). However, Medicare beneficiaries
may pay a premium for Part B (physician services), and purchase a Medicare Advantage health
plan from a private insurer under Part C in lieu of traditional Medicare Parts A and B
coverage, and also purchase a prescription drug coverage plan from a private insurer under
Part D.
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individuals, in a national pool of nearly 45 million Americans.47 The federal
government also pays directly for care for 7.8 million veterans enrolled in the
Veteran Affairs health care system and a large fraction of the 9 million
military personnel, dependents and retirees for whom the Department of
Defense is responsible.48 State-based Medicaid and SCHIP programs, which
together cover more than 61 million people,49 do enroll some beneficiaries in
private health plans, but pay providers directly for most care. These
government benefit programs pay for health care for about 40% of
Americans.50 They also account for more than half of total health care
expenditures.51
These examples indicate that a growing percentage of the health
insurance business lies not in risk-bearing indemnity insurance, but in
providing administrative services for government benefit programs and
private self-funded plans. Although the profit margin for administrative
service contracts may be lower than for risk-bearing insurance policies, the
former may prove to be a more relevant and reliable business model for the
health insurance industry’s future.
IV. PAYING FOR CARE v. SPREADING RISK
Health insurers have moved away from conventional indemnity insurance
practices, even in their own health plans.52 Fewer than eleven million
Americans bought individual health insurance policies in 2006,53 down from
16 million in 1999.54 Most employees and their dependents with health
insurance are in employer-sponsored plans, most with some form of managed
47
Total Number of Medicare Beneficiaries, Kaiser Family Foundation State
Health
Care
Facts
(2009),
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=290&cat=6.
48
Inst. of Med., Combating Tobacco Use in Military and Veteran Populations 34
(2009).
49
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services & Center for Medicaid and State Operations,
Trends in Medicaid Persons Served and Vendor Payments: Fiscal Years 1975-2005, available
at www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareMedicaidStatSupp/downloads/08Fig13.3.pdf; Total Medicaid
Enrollment, Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Care Facts (2009),
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=198&cat=4; Kaiser Comm’n on
Medicaid and the Uninsured, SCHIP Turns 10: An Update on Enrollment and the
Outlook on Reauthorization from the Program’s Directors 5 (2007), available at
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7642.pdf.
50
Marmor, supra note 46, at 179.
51
Thomas M. Selden & Merrile Sing, The Distribution of Public Spending for Health Care
in the United States, 2002, Health Aff. w349, w353, w357 (2008) (public spending on
health care for the non-institutionalized civilian population averaged 56% of total spending;
adding institutionalized civilians raises public spending to more than 64% of the total).
52
See Michelle M. Doty et al., Failure to Protect: Why the Individual Insurance Market Is
Not a Viable Option for Most U.S. Families, The Commonwealth Fund, 6-7, (2009),
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care. About 8% of employees work for employers that offer conventional
indemnity insurance.55 Although the Department of Labor classified 76% of
the workers in private industry with health benefits as covered by “indemnity”
insurance in 2005, it found only 7% had traditional indemnity insurance
policies that allow choice of provider without payment restrictions.56 The rest
were in plans organized as PPOs [Preferred Provider Organizations] and
HDHP/HSAs [High deductible health plans/health savings accounts], which
are gaining market share, while an additional 24% were in prepaid plans like
HMOs, which are declining. More recent surveys suggest that only 2% of all
workers are enrolled in conventional indemnity plans.57
The world of health benefits is making conventional insurance models
obsolete. Instead of insurance policies, we have health plans, which perform
two distinct financial functions: risk spreading for unanticipated health
problems; and paying for routine or regular health services. The risk
spreading function of health insurance remains for unpredicted medical
problems. Yet, the financial need for risk spreading is largely confined to
illnesses and injuries that are expensive to diagnose or treat. In contrast, the
payment function operates like a service contract to pay for routine health
care visits, such as regularly scheduled physical examinations and dental
cleanings.58 The addition of the service contract function to insurance policies
is a welcome, but striking departure from insurance jurisprudence, which has
prized the risk spreading function of insurance above all other possible
purposes.59
Two premises underlie risk spreading. First, risks should be predictable
for a population; that is, the probability of a harm (loss) occurring in a
population should be ascertainable. Second, risks should be unpredictable for
an individual; that is, whether it will occur to a particular individual should be
uncertain.60 Uncertainty for the individual is embedded in the fortuity
principle, the assumption that insurance is designed for losses that a specific
individual cannot expect to incur (beyond the general possibility for all others
similarly situated).61 Although actuaries are skilled at estimating the
percentage of a given population that is likely to experience glaucoma, for
example, in any given year, the risk of glaucoma for a particular individual is
55
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considered insurable only if the individual has no specific knowledge that s/he
has or will soon have the disease. Decades of court decisions confirm that
policyholders who know they are about to suffer a loss or who bring one about
are not entitled to the benefits of insurance.62 The known loss doctrine
precludes coverage of a loss that has already occurred or one that the
policyholder reasonably expected to occur.63 The federal Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit described the doctrine as inherent in the concept of
insurance: “[t]he known loss doctrine seeks to prevent the concept of an
insurable risk from becoming a mere fiction when the insured knows there is
a substantial probability that it has suffered or will suffer a loss covered by the
policy.”64 As Thomas Morawetz notes, “in a world that is perfectly ordered,
controlled, and determined, insurance has no meaning.”65
Yet, today’s health plans do provide benefits for predictable expenses.
Many plans pay for preventive services, such as immunizations,
mammograms, cholesterol screening, and annual physical examinations, and
the 2010 Act requires coverage of certain preventive services.66 In the
conventional sense of insurance, these are not insurable risks, because they
are expected events, controlled and scheduled by the patient.67 For sound
reasons of public policy, however, states have required health insurers to pay
for many such services as mandated benefits, and many insurers have done so
voluntarily in response to consumer demand.
It has become nearly impossible for insurers to spread risk solely by
increasing premiums to cover rising health care costs, which now exceed 2
trillion dollars.68 They need to control their expenditures, but their options
are limited.69
Two – reducing payments to providers and reducing
administrative costs and profit margins – do not appeal to those who would
lose income.70 The remaining options, which are traditional insurance tools,
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run contrary to the goals of reform: excluding people with higher risks of
illness from coverage or charging them actuarially fair, but very high, possibly
unaffordable premiums; excluding coverage of preexisting or expensive
conditions or treatments; and capping coverage amounts.
Instead of using conventional insurance techniques, therefore, insurers
must try to manage their costs by either limiting or discouraging the use of
unnecessary or overly expensive covered services.
Pre-authorization
requirements for specialty care and specific treatments and caps on the
number of covered treatments or visits are examples of limiting techniques.
Discouragement techniques include cost sharing: co-insurance, deductibles,
and co-payments. These management techniques are intended to keep
covered losses within bounds by influencing the behavior of people enrolled in
a health plan, but they are admittedly blunt tools.71
Management techniques are sometimes viewed as ways to reduce moral
hazard – the possibility that once insured, a person has less incentive to
prevent a loss (or avoid health care services).72 But, moral hazard is less likely
to affect a person’s behavior with respect to health care than it can with
respect to other types of insurance, like fire or automobile insurance, because
the policyholder suffers the loss physically as well as financially. Instead,
moral hazard is more likely to affect policyholder decisions about elective and
preventive services, where the patient has more control and can behave more
like a consumer than a patient.73 In other words, moral hazard arises more
naturally on the service-contract side of a health plan than on the riskspreading indemnity side.
Paradoxically, while health plans manage risk on the risk-spreading side
of the policy by limiting the use of services, they manage risk on the servicecontract side of the policy by encouraging the use of services. Patients are
supposed to avoid using some services, like MRIs, while consumers are
encouraged to use others, like immunizations, regularly.
If insurers
responded to moral hazard in conventional ways, they would discourage
policyholders from voluntarily using too many elective services. Moreover, as
Tom Baker makes clear, insurers face their own moral hazard,74 since they
have a financial incentive to retain as much of the premiums as possible by
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paying fewer benefits.75
Here again, health plans diverge from the
conventional model of insurance.
Before the 2010 Act endorsed coverage of prevention, health plans began
to cover an increasing number of preventive and disease management
services.76 The federal government encouraged group health plans to adopt
this service coverage by exempting most “wellness programs” from HIPAA’s
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of a health factor.77 Although
these programs are often described as reducing the need for more expensive
medical care in the future,78 the evidence on cost saving is mixed.79 Too few
preventive services save money in the long run.80 The best reason for
encouraging prevention programs is to improve people’s health, not to reduce
covered losses.81
It makes sense to pay for prevention if one thinks of the risk of disease in
terms of health status instead of financial loss.82 Health plans that pay for
preventive services are simply financing disease prevention and health
promotion. Thus, coverage of preventive services has moved health plan
operations further from conventional insurance and closer to functioning as
health care payment plans. Furthermore, to the extent that these efforts
succeed, Medicare, not insurance, may ultimately pay for the care that is
needed at the end of longer, healthier lives.83
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V. USING ACTUARIAL EXPERTISE WITHOUT UNDERWRITING
There is ample historical precedent for using the expertise of actuaries
and insurance claims administrators in contexts beyond conventional
commercial indemnity insurance. Insurance policies have been viewed as
devices for thrift, 84 self-help,85 mutual aid,86 investment,87 gambling,88 and
even defying the will of God,89 in the United States and elsewhere.
The perspective of William Beveridge, the founder of Britain’s national
health insurance system, has special resonance for American health reform.90
Beveridge conceived of social insurance as a thrift mechanism, and the
government needed this thrift to reduce the number of people receiving “poor
relief.”91 Beveridge distinguished between “compulsory thrift” to pay for
necessities and “voluntary thrift” for everything else.92 Since necessities must
be available to everyone, he argued, the state is a proper party to organize
their provision.93 To cover everyone, of course, contributions had to be
compulsory, which only the state can require. Social insurance financed by
compulsory fees provides protection against financial risks in the same way
that that police departments financed by taxes provide protection against
property damage and bodily injury.94 However, people were free to purchase
voluntary indemnity insurance for non-necessities in the private market.
Many Western European countries adopted “social insurance” schemes for
health care before commercial insurers had secured much of a market in
private policies.95 Governments could incorporate insurers into the new
national health system to act as financial facilitators or administrators of a
public program, rather than risk-bearing entrepreneurial vendors of
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commercial policies.96 Health insurance entities, whether private or public,
developed within a more or less carefully regulated sphere to serve a public
function.97 This approach, which varies from country to country,98 takes
advantage of insurers’ actuarial expertise, while tailoring the companies’
business operations to the national program’s goals. Although companies are
profitable, their national health program activities are more ministerial than
entrepreneurial.99
In contrast, health insurance in the United States grew up largely
independently in the private sector and has deep roots in the entrepreneurial
ethos of private enterprise.100 Blue Cross and Blue Shield began with an
indemnity insurance model (yet avoiding regulation as an insurer),101 while
employer-based groups like Kaiser Permanente created prepaid service
models.102 In the absence of a national health program, most private health
plans grew to mimic conventional lines of commercial indemnity insurance.
This may explain some industry resistance to reforms that look more like
social insurance. Yet, as more recent history shows, private health insurance
companies do much more than sell conventional indemnity insurance.103
Private insurers now administer government benefits, as well as self-insured
employee group health plans, resembling Western European practice. Many of
the health benefit programs that we call insurance today are insurance in
name only.
All health care programs, including private plans and social insurance
schemes, must determine what kind of care should be available to all: what to
pay for; how to price it; what sources of revenue to use; what limits to put on
which services; and how to encourage the most appropriate care.104 These

96
See Richard A. Knox, Germany: One Nation with Health Care for All 54-56
(1993); Timothy B. Smith, Creating the Welfare State in France, 1880-1940 130-38
(2003). See also Deborah Stone, The Samaritan’s Dilemma: Should Government Help
Your Neighbor? 274-79 (2008).
97
See generally Rowena Jacobs & Maria Goddard, Univ. of York Centre for Health
Economics, Social Health Insurance Systems in European Countries: The Role of
the Insurer in the Health Care System: A Comparative Study of Four European
Countries (2000), available at www.york.ac.uk/inst/che/pdf/op39.pdf (describing the health
insurance programs in Germany, Switzerland, France and the Netherlands, including the
history of these programs, how they are financed, and the health status of the populations in
these nations).
98
For a succinct comparison of systems, see Thomas S. Bodenheimer & Kevin
Grumbach, Understanding Health Policy: A Clinical Approach 163-79 (5th ed. 2009).
99
This does not insulate such systems from cost pressures. See, e.g., Paul Clay Sorum,
France Tries to Save Its Ailing National Health System, 26 J. Pub. Health Pol’y 231, 239
(2005); Jere A. Wysong & Thomas Abel, Universal Health Insurance and High-Risk Groups
in West Germany: Implications for U.S. Health Policy, 68 Milbank Q. 527, 530-31 (1990);
Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Christian Hagist, Who’s Going Broke? Comparing Growth in Health
Care Costs in Ten OECD Countries, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,Working Paper No. 11833,
2005) at 8-11, 17.
100
Richmond & Fein, supra note 13, at 30-42.
101
Robert Cunningham III & Robert M. Cunningham Jr., The Blues: A History of
the Blue Cross and Blue Shield System 93-97 (1997).
102
Rickey Hendricks, A Model for National Health Care: The History of Kaiser
Permanente 1-3, 28 (1993).
103
See Part IV supra.
104
See generally Henry J. Aaron & Paul B. Ginsburg, Is Health Spending Excessive? If So,
What Can We Do About It?, 28 Health Aff. 1260 (Sept./Oct. 2009) (analyzing the causes of

450 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 36 NO. 2&3 2010
decisions depend on predictions of the population’s medical needs and the
providers and services needed. Insurance companies with expertise in
estimating needs and costs, as well as administering payments, can play a role
in this process, whether or not they act as risk-bearing gatekeepers.
It must be recognized that private insurers cannot be expected to accept
everyone who applies for coverage regardless of health status, provide
comprehensive care including preventive services, and also keep premiums
relatively affordable unless everyone is in the aggregate insurance pool.
Without universal participation, healthy people would rationally wait to
purchase insurance until they needed it, as adverse selection predicts, and
premiums prices would rise to meet the costs of caring for those who need
care. After COBRA and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 required insurers to provide post-employment coverage to
qualified employees,105 the General Accountability Office found that insurers
“discouraged individuals from applying for coverage or charged them rates
140 to 600 percent of the standard premium.”106 Thus, the goal of keeping
premiums affordable depends on requiring participation by virtually everyone
in the population or allowing government to convert the system into one of
complete or partial social insurance. If the American system seeks to enable
private insurers to provide coverage, it must require participation by all those
who do not now have health benefits in some form.
VI. CONCLUSION
A majority of the Congress and the public support health care payment
plans that look almost nothing like conventional indemnity insurance: health
plans that accept all people regardless of health status, cover both existing and
future medical conditions, and pay for preventive as well as acute care
services.107 In reality, these plans are a very different species of insurance, one
that uniquely combines elements of risk spreading insurance and service
payment commitments. Legislators who believe that everyone should have
insurance cannot achieve universal coverage without eliminating most
conventional insurance practices and transforming the very meaning and
function of health insurance. A more transparent approach to reform would
make explicit that health plans constitute a valuable, separate species of
insurance designed primarily to finance socially beneficial health services by
spreading the cost of care.
Recognizing health insurance as a separate species of insurance has
several advantages. It more accurately reflects how we use health plans today
– as vehicles to pay for care – and mutes opposition to reform that is based
high health care spending in the U.S., including consumer demand for health care and health
insurance coverage, and economic incentives for overtreatment).
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solely on the assumption that only conventional indemnity insurance is real
insurance. In addition, it embraces coverage of both acute and preventive
care, avoiding disputes over what counts as an insurable risk, and focuses on
calculating costs without imposing controversial underwriting practices.
Most important, it should allow us to proceed with the real work of designing
a reasonable benefit package. Policy makers can think more clearly about
what care should be available to all and how to pay for it.
To be sure, treating health insurance as a distinct species of insurance
will require adjusting some traditional statutory and legal doctrines that
underpin insurability, coverage, and contract interpretation.108 Adapting legal
principles to innovative relationships is a familiar challenge to law, however,
not a significant obstacle. Health insurance plans can occupy a conceptual
space between conventional insurance and consumer transactions, which
serves its real role as financing health care.
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